This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to estimate other players' actions. To solve the problem, a leaderfollowing consensus gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is proposed. This algorithm utilizes only the measurements of the player's local cost function without the knowledge of its explicit expression or the requirement on its smoothness. Hence, the algorithm is gradient-free during the entire updating process. Moreover, the analysis on the convergence of the Nash equilibrium is studied for the algorithm with both diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, in the case of diminishing step-size, it is shown that the players' actions converge to the Nash equilibrium almost surely, while in the case of fixed step-size, the convergence to the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium is achieved. The performance of the proposed algorithm is verified through numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the decades, game theory, as a power tool of analyzing the strategic interactions between rational decision-makers, has found its great potential in various application fields such as social science, economics, electricity markets, power systems, to list a few. An important concept in game theory, Nash equilbrium, named after John Forbes Nash Jr., is a proposed solution in non-cooperative games involving two or more players. Recently, with the emergence of multi-agent system, Nash equilibrium seeking in multi-player non-cooperative games has received increasing attention. More precisely, this type of games involves a number of players, who selfishly minimize their own cost functions by making decisions in response to other players' actions.
Recently, a large number of studies on Nash equilibrium computation in non-cooperative games have been reported, such as [1] - [6] to list a few. The challenge of such problem settings is the requirement of global knowledge on all players' actions, which is not practical if the underlying communication network is not fully connected. In such cases, players have to make decisions based only on a limited set of information, such as the information from the neighbors. Therefore, a *This research was supported in part by Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 1 RG180/17(2017-T1-002-158), and in part by the National Research Foundation, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore under the Energy Innovation Research Programme (EIRP) for Building Energy Efficiency Grant Call, administered by the Building and Construction Authority (NRF2013EWT-EIRP004-051).
Y. Pang distributed information sharing protocol is usually adopted to disseminate the local information among players. For example, a dynamic average consensus protocol was adopted in [7] , where a primal-dual dynamic based seeking strategy was developed to find Nash equilibrium in set constrained aggregate games. It was also utilized in [8] with the help of differential inclusions and differentiated projections for aggregative games, where the players' actions are coupled by linear constraints. The dynamic average consensus protocol was also proposed to achieve simultaneous social cost minimization and Nash equilibrium in a class of N -coalition games in [9] . Different from these works, the work in [10] considered a continuous time generalized convex game with shared inequality constraints among players, and proposed a leaderfollowing consensus protocol with gradient descent method to compute the generalized Nash equilibrium. This protocol was also employed in [11] to estimate the other players' actions for the generalized games, where the players' action sets are constrained by nonlinear inequality and linear equations. Apart from the leader-following consensus and dynamic average consensus protocols, gossip-based averaging techniques were also commonly utilized in Nash equilibrium computations, such as [12] , [13] . Most of the existing literature including the aforementioned works are model-based approaches, i.e., the implementation of the algorithms relies on the knowledge of the explicit form of the players' cost functions, such as the derivative computation. However, the requirement of the knowledge on the explicit expression of players' cost functions is restrictive in the cases where the input/output relationship is difficult to model.
There are non-model based approaches, which utilize the players' local measurements without the requirement on the information of the functional form. For example, the work in [14] considered a generalized convex game with both convex coupling inequality constraints and local set constraints. A finite-differencing method with two-way perturbations was proposed to approximate the partial gradient. The perturbation parameter needs to be chosen carefully to match the selected step-size. Different from that, the work in [15] proposed a distributed payoff-based algorithm for a class of convex games with and without coupling constraints. This technique was further extended in [16] where the algorithm convergence was proved under mere monotonicity assumption. Overall, the payoff-based learning strategy proposed in these two works enables players to sample their actions in a Gaussian distribution. Then, the mean of this distribution is iteratively updated using only local payoff values. Another typical nonmodel based approaches are extremum seeking-based methods, such as [17] - [22] . Specifically, the work in [17] proposed a continuous time multi-input stochastic extremum seeking algorithm for the Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games with general nonlinear cost functions. In [18] , a discrete time stochastic extremum seeking method was presented in non-cooperative games where the players' cost functions are strictly convex, but the actions are subject to a linear dynamic constraint. The work in [19] developed an integrator-type extremum seeking algorithm in non-cooperative games with both quadratic payoffs and general non-quadratic payoffs as the output of a dynamic system. More extremum seeking algorithms have been proposed in potential games with unstable dynamics [20] , dynamical constraints [21] , and noncooperative games with time-varying Nash equilibrium [23] . In general, the extremum seeking strategy makes use of the cost value together with some sinusoidal dither signals for perturbation, such that the gradient of the cost function is extractable. Even though all the aforementioned works need no explicit model information during the implementation, they assume the players' cost functions to be smooth to some extent, which can be restrictive if the players' cost functions are generally non-differentiable. This motivates the study of gradient-free technique, which is free of the knowledge on the explicit expressions of the players' cost functions and applicable to non-differentiable problems. In fact, gradientfree algorithms have been studied in distributed optimization problems [24] - [29] . However, little attention has been received in non-cooperative games.
In this paper, we focus on the research of non-model based Nash equilibrium seeking methods. Specifically, a gradientfree distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a multi-player non-cooperative static game under a directed communication graph. As compared to the existing literature, the major contributions of this paper are twofold.
1) The proposed algorithm does not rely on the knowledge of the explicit form of the players' cost functions. Different from non-model based approaches such as payoffbased learning [15] , [16] and extremum seeking [17] - [22] , the proposed algorithm allows the cost functions to be non-smooth. Unlike the finite-differencing method in [14] where the perturbation parameter needs to match the step-size, the proposed algorithm establishes the convergence to the Nash equilibrium with only the requirement of a small smoothing parameter.
2) The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium is rigorously studied for both diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, for the diminishing case, an exact convergence to the Nash equilibrium is attained, while for the constant case, an approximate convergence to the Nash equilibrium with the gap proportional to the step-size is achieved.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem is defined in section II. Main procedures of the proposed algorithm are described in section III. The convergence analysis of the proposed algorithm for both diminishing step-size and constant step-size is presented in section IV. In section V, the performance of the proposed algorithm is illustrated through a numerical example. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section firstly introduces the notations used. Then, the problem is formulated, followed by some preliminary results.
A. Notations
We use R and R N to denote the set of real numbers and Ndimensional column vectors, respectively. For a matrix A, the element in the i-th row and j-th column of A is represented by [A] ij , and its transpose is denoted by A . We write E[·] to denote the expected value of a random variable. For any two vectors x and y, the operator x, y denotes the inner product of x and y. We use x for the standard Euclidean norm of a vector x, i.e., x =
x, x , and P Ω [x] for the projection of a vector x on the set Ω, i.e., P Ω [x] = arg minx ∈Ω x − x 2 . For a differentiable function f , we use ∇ x f (x, y) to represent its partial derivative with respect to x at the point (x, y). For a possibly non-differentiable function f , we denote its ε-subdifferential by ∂ ε x f (x, y) at x for any fixed y, i.e.,
x f (x, y). If ε = 0, we simplify the notation to ∂ x f (x, y), which is the set of its subgradients at x for any fixed y. For a sequence of random vectors a k , we say that a k converges to a almost surely, if the probability of lim k→∞ a k = a is 1.
B. Problem Definition
We consider a directed communication graph represented by G = {V, E}, where V is the set of agents, and E ⊂ V × V is the set of edges, i.e., for any i, j ∈ V, the ordered pair (i, j) ∈ E if and only if the information can be transfered from agent i to agent j. In particular, the set E includes (i, i) for all i ∈ V. A matrix A associated with the directed graph G is known as the adjacency matrix, which is designed such that [A] ij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E and [A] ij = 0 otherwise. The set of inneighbors (respectively, out-neighbors) of agent i is denoted by N in i = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E} (respectively, N out i = {j ∈ V|(i, j) ∈ E}). In particular, agent i is both an in-neighbor and an out-neighbor of itself, i.e., i ∈ N in i and i ∈ N out i . It should be noted that N in i = N out i in general. Consider a game Γ with N players that communicate with each other under a directed communication graph
represents the action of player i (respectively, all players except player i). Under the communication graph G, if player j is not an out-neighbor of player i (i.e., j / ∈ N out i ), then player j does not have direct access to player i's action. Game Γ(N, {f i }, {Ω i }, G) is played such that for given x −i ∈ Ω −i , the objective of each player i ∈ V is to minimize its own cost function, i.e.,
It should be emphasized that the explicit mathematical expression of the cost function f i is unknown, but each player i ∈ V can measure the value of f i by introducing some input to the system f i . Moreover, the solution set of player i ∈ V to the problem (1) is dependent on the other players' action x −i , which may not be directly accessible. Thus, the objective is to develop a distributed strategy such that all players' actions converge to a Nash equilibrium under the communication graph G.
The formal definition of a Nash equilibrium of a game Γ is given below [30] .
Nash equilibrium is an action profile where no player can reduce its cost by unilaterally changing its own action, i.e., a vector
The following standard assumptions are made throughout the paper.
Assumption 1: The directed graph G is strongly connected and its associated adjacency matrix A is doubly-stochastic, i.e.,
Assumption 2: For each player i ∈ V, its action set Ω i is non-empty, convex and compact. The cost function
Remark 1: Both Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard and commonly assumed in distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems. In particular, Assumption 2 implies that game
C. Preliminaries
Since the cost function f i (x i , x −i ) may not be partially differentiable in x i as in Assumption 2, we introduce a Gaussian-smoothed version of the cost function f i (x i , x −i ) given by [34] 
From the results in [27] - [29] , [34] , it can be easily shown that the functions g i
satisfy some properties which are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. The functions
2) The function f i,µ i (x i , x −i ) is partially differentiable in x i and its partial derivative with respect to x i satisfies
and is Lipschitz continuous in x i with a constant L 1 = max i∈V D1 µ i , and Lipschitz continuous in
We formulate a smoothed version of game Γ with the Gaussian-smoothed cost function
. Under Assumption 2, the hold of Lemma 1 implies that the smoothed cost functions f i,µ i have similar properties to f i stated in Assumption 2. Hence, game Γ µ (N, {f i,µ i }, {Ω i }, G) admits a Nash equilibrium for the same reasoning as in Remark 1. The following result shows the equivalence of games Γ and Γ µ under certain conditions. Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Games Γ and Γ µ are equivalent and share the same Nash equilibria when the smoothing parameter µ i , ∀i ∈ V tends to 0. Proof: From Remark 1 and previous discussion, Assumption 2 implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in both games Γ and Γ µ . Moreover, applying Squeeze Theorem to Lemma 1-1), we have
Then, games Γ and Γ µ share the same number of players, cost functions, action sets and communication graph. Hence the result holds.
Next, we make some definitions on the game mappings of games Γ(N,
For game Γ, since the cost function f i in game Γ is not necessarily differentiable, so the game mapping of game Γ refers to a set-valued map F(x), which is defined as the map of the subdifferentials of all players' cost functions:
If the cost function f i is differentiable, then the game mapping F(x) reduces to a single-valued map. For game Γ µ , since the cost function f i,µ i is differentiable, so the game mapping of game Γ µ refers to a single-valued map F µ , which is defined by stacking the partial derivatives of all smoothed cost functions:
When µ i tends to 0 for all i ∈ V, we denote the game mapping F µ by F 0 (x), i.e.,
Thus, based on Lemma 1-2), we have F 0 (x) ∈ F(x).
III. GRADIENT-FREE DISTRIBUTED NE SEEKING
In this section, we describe our proposed distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithm in details.
At time k, each player i ∈ V maintains an estimate of all players' actions, denoted by y i k = [y i 1,k , . . . , y i N,k ] ∈ R N , where y i j,k , j ∈ V represents player i's estimate of player j's action. Hence, at time k, every player l ∈ V passes its estimate of all players' actions y l j,k , j ∈ V and its own action x l,k to its out-neighbors. Then, for each player i ∈ V, on receiving the information from its in-neighbors, it updates its own action and the estimate of all players' actions (including the estimate of its own local action) based on the following updating laws:
where g i µ i (y i k ) is the randomized gradient-free oracle
The parameter δ i > 0 is a constant, and α k ≥ 0 is a stepsize sequence. The initial values x i,0 and y i j,0 for i, j ∈ V can be any real numbers. The adjacency matrix A is doublystochastic as supposed in Assumption 1. It should be noted that the design of a doubly-stochastic adjacency matrix A for a given directed graph is non-trivial. The detailed procedures can be referred to the work in [35] , where two distributed strategies (imbalance-correcting algorithm and load-pushing algorithm) have been developed to construct such matrix under different conditions. With the well-constructed matrix A, each player i selects the parameter δ i such that 0 ≤ δ i [A] ij < 2[A] ii for all j ∈ V. The above mentioned procedures are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Remark 2: In (2b), it should be noted that [A] ij = 0 if player j is NOT an in-neighbor of player i, which implies that player i updates the estimate of player j's action only based on the estimates y l j,k from its in-neighbors l ∈ N in i . On the other Algorithm 1 Gradient-free distributed NE seeking
hand, if player j is an in-neighbor of player i, then [A] ij = 0 giving rise to an additional error term δ i [A] ij (x j,k − y i j,k ) in the update of the estimate on player j's action.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the convergence of the algorithm to the Nash equilibrium for the scenarios of diminishing stepsize and constant step-size, respectively. We let F k denote the σ-field generated by the entire history of the random variables from step 0 to k − 1, i.e.,
Next, we introduce an important property related to the adjacency matrix A summarized in the following lemma: Lemma 3: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let δ l > 0, l ∈ V be selected such that 0 ≤ δ l [A] li < 2[A] ll for all i ∈ V, where A is the adjacency matrix. Then, there exists a constant C > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for k ≥ 1, the matrixÃ i given by
We first show that all the row sums ofÃ i are always less than or equal to 1.
Hence, we always have Next, we show that all the eigenvalues ofÃ i have magnitude less than or equal to 1. Let λ be an eigenvalue of the matrix A i , and let v = [v 1 , . . . , v N ] be a corresponding eigenvector. Then we have λv =Ã i v, i.e., for each row j ∈ V
Suppose the k-th entry of v has the maximal absolute value (denoted by |v|) among all |v j |, j ∈ V. Then, letting j = k in the above equation, and noting that all the entries ofÃ i are non-negative and the row sums are less than or equal to 1, we have
which leads to |λ| ≤ 1 as |v| > 0. Next, we show |λ| = 1 by contradiction. Suppose |λ| = 1, then the relation (4) is true if the equal signs in both inequalities are satisfied, which implies the following properties: 1) (first equal sign) if [Ã i ] kn = 0, then |v n | = |v|; 2) (second equal sign) [A] ki = 0. If player k has an in-neighbour, say player n = k, then [Ã i ] kn = [A] kn = 0. From property 1), we have |v n | = |v|. Thus, the n-th entry of v also has the maximal absolute value. That means if player n ∈ V is a direct in-neighbor of the player k ∈ V with |v k | = |v|, then |v n | = |v|. Since the graph is strongly connected, thus we can always find a path for each player n ∈ V linking to player k, i.e., n → · · · → k. Thus, from the above analysis, we have |v n | = · · · = |v k | = |v| along this path. Therefore, we have |v n | = |v| for all n ∈ V. From property 2), |v n | = |v| for all n ∈ V implies that [A] ni = 0 for all n ∈ V, which is impossible due to the strong connectivity of the graph. Therefore, the eigenvalues ofÃ i can only have magnitude strictly less than 1, i.e., |λ| < 1.
Finally, we representÃ k i in the Jordan canonical form for some P m , J m and Q m . Since all the eigenvalues ofÃ i have magnitude smaller than 1, then the diagonal entries in J m are smaller than 1, for all m. Thus, there exists a constant C > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
which completes the proof. Remark 3: Similar to the result in [36, Corollary 1], constants C and γ in Lemma 3 depend on the minimum weight (denoted by φ) that each player gives to its own value and the values of its neighbors (i.e., if [A] ij > 0, then [A] ij ≥ φ), the number of players N , and the parameters {δ l } l∈V selected by all players. Moreover, for larger N and smaller φ, constant γ gets closer to 1, implying a slower convergence rate; for δ l → 0 or δ l [A] li → 2[A] ll , ∀l ∈ V, matrixÃ i reduces to A and constant γ gets closer to 1, implying a slower convergence rate.
A. Diminishing Step-Size
In this part, we adopt the diminishing step-size sequence in the proposed algorithm, i.e., the step-size sequence α k satisfies that ∞ k=0 α k = ∞ and ∞ k=0 α 2 k < ∞. Now, we present the result on the consensus property: for any i ∈ V, each player l's estimate of player i's action y l i,k , l ∈ V converges to player i's real action x i,k as k goes to infinity, which is formally stated in the following theorem. 
Proof: It can be obtained from (2a) and (2b) that
Then, taking the subtraction and applying the norm
where the first inequality follows from the projection's nonexpansive property, and the equality holds by the defintion of A i as in Lemma 3. Hence, we obtain that
Then, taking the total expectation, it follows from Lemmas 1-3) and 3 that
whereσ = max i∈V σ i and σ i = max m∈V |x i,0 − y m i,0 |. Taking the limit k → ∞ and noting that lim k→∞ α k = 0, the desired result follows from [27, ].
Remark 4: Theorem 1 is a characterization of the consensus property of the algorithm. For any i ∈ V, each player l's estimate of player i's action y l i,k , l ∈ V converges to player i's real action x i,k as k goes to infinity. Now, we make a mild assumption on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in game Γ as follows.
Assumption 3: The game mapping F of game Γ is strictly monotone on Ω, i.e., for any x, y ∈ Ω, x = y, f (x), f (y) ∈ F, we have f (x) − f (y), x − y > 0.
Remark 5: Assumption 3 ensures the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in game Γ. Now, we are ready to establish the convergence of all players' actions to the unique Nash equilibrium of game Γ, which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let x = (x i , x −i ) be the action profile at the unique Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. Let {x i,k } k≥0 , {y l i,k } k≥0 , i, l ∈ V be the sequences generated by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with a step-size sequence {α k } k≥0 satisfying
where A is the adjacency matrix. Then, the sequence {x k } k≥0 converges to x almost surely when the smoothing parameter µ i , ∀i ∈ V tends to 0. Proof: Noting that there might be multiple Nash equilibria in game Γ µ , we let x µ = (x i,µ i , x −i,µ −i ) be an action profile at one of them. Applying [13, Lemma 1] yields
Thus, subtracting (2a) by the above equation, and taking the norm
where we have applied the projection's non-expansive property. Taking the conditional expectation on F k , we obtain
It is noted that
we have applied 2 a ≤ 1+ a 2 in the second inequality and (5) in the third inequality. Thus, combining the above results to (6) and summing over i ∈ V
Taking the limit µ i → ∞ for ∀i ∈ V, it follows from Lemma 2 that lim µ i →∞,∀i∈V x µ = x . Thus, it can be obtained from (7) that
Following the results in [27, Lemma 3] and the step-size
Applying Lemma 11 in [37, Ch. 2] to (8), we can obtain that x k − x converges almost surely, and
From Assumption 3 and the fact that F 0 (x) ∈ F(x), we have
Since x k −x converges almost surely, we obtain the desired result.
Remark 6: Theorem 2 shows that the players' action profile x k will converge to the unique Nash equilibrium x of game Γ by selecting the diminishing smoothing parameter sequence.
B. Constant Step-Size
In this part, we suppose the step-size α k = α, which is a positive constant.
A similar result to Theorem 1 on the consensus property can be established. Instead of achieving the exact convergence, for any i ∈ V, each player l's estimate of player i's action y l i,k , l ∈ V approximately converges to player i's real action x i,k with an error proportional to the step-size. The following theorem formally states the result. Theorem 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let {x i,k } k≥0 , {y l i,k } k≥0 , i, l ∈ V be the sequences generated by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with a constant step-size sequence α k = α, and a positive constant δ l , l ∈ V satisfying 0 ≤ δ l [A] li < 2[A] ll for all i ∈ V, where A is the adjacency matrix. Then, we have
Proof: Following same arguments as in Theorem 1, the result holds by taking the limsup on both sides of (5). Next, we introduce a slightly stronger assumption compared to Assumption 3 on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in game Γ.
Assumption 4: The game mapping F of game Γ is strongly monotone on Ω with a constant χ > 0, i.e., for any x, y ∈ Ω,
Remark 7: Assumption 4 also ensures the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in game Γ. Now, we are ready to characterize the approximate convergence of all players' actions to the Nash equilibrium of game Γ, which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Let x = (x i , x −i ) be the action profile at the unique Nash equilibrium of game Γ. Let {x i,k } k≥0 , {y l i,k } k≥0 , i, l ∈ V be the sequences generated by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with a constant stepsize sequence α k = α satisfying the following condition
and a positive constant
where A is the adjacency matrix. Then, with the smoothing parameter µ i , ∀i ∈ V tending to 0, the sequence {x k } k≥0 satisfies
Proof: From Assumption 4 and the fact that F 0 (x) ∈ F(x), we have x k −x , F 0 (x k )−F 0 (x ) ≥ χ x k −x . Following the same arguments as in Theorem 2, and applying the above results to (8) , we obtain
Taking the total expectation and the limsup on both sides, we complete the proof based on the step-size condition (9) . Remark 8: In general, if the constant step-size α is set small, then the step-size condition (9) can be satisfied. Theorem 4 shows that all players' actions approximately converge to the Nash equilibrium of game Γ with an error depending on the step-size α, the number of players N , the cost function parameters D 1 , D 2 (L and B are functions of D 1 , D 2 ) and the communication topology γ. It should also be noted that if the step-size α is small, then the error bound is close to 0. 
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithm by a numerical example. Consider an energy consumption game of N players for Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system (see [38] ), where the cost function of each player i can be modeled by the following quadratic function:
where a i > 0, b > 0, c and x r i are constants for i ∈ V. It is easy to verify that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 are satisfied. Throughout the simulation, we let a i = 1 for i ∈ V, b = 0.1 and c = 10. In the following simulation, we investigate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm from the perspectives of network topology and number of players, followed by a comparison with the gradient-based counterpart.
A. Network Topology
In this part, we first consider N = 5 players under three different communication graphs as shown in Fig. 1 . Obviously, all these digraphs are strongly connected, hence Assumption 1 is satisfied. Constant x r i for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} is set to 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, respectively. For the implementation of the algorithm, the step-size α k is set to 0.1/ √ k + 1. Besides, we let the smoothing parameter sequence to be diminishing, e.g., µ i k = 10 −2 /k + 1 and δ i = 0.5 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. The initial values of all players' actions x 0 and the estimates of all players' actions y i 0 from player i for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} are all set to 0. The relative errors of all players' actions ( x k − x / x ) produced by the proposed gradient-free method with diminishing step-size for three different network topologies are plotted in Fig. 2 . As can be observed, con- vergence can be achieved under all three network topologies. Specifically, the performance is better for the graph with more edges due to the increased number of communication channels.
B. Number of Players
In this part, we increase the number of players to N = 10, 20, 30 and 40 under a strongly connected communication graph as shown in Fig. 3 . We set x r i = 2i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. The rest of parameters are set the same as in section V-A. It is shown in Fig. 4 that the relative errors of all players' actions ( x k − x / x ) produced by the proposed gradientfree method with diminishing step-size for N = 10, 20, 30 and 40. As can be seen, the algorithm is scalable to different number of players, and the convergence result is better for smaller number of players, which is as expected.
C. Gradient-Free vs. Gradient-Based Algorithm
In this part, we compare the performance of the proposed gradient-free algorithm with its gradient-based counterpart. Specifically, the gradient-based algorithm adopts the same updating laws as in (2a) and (2b), but the gradient-free oracle is replaced with the true gradient information. We consider the same problem settings as in section V-A under the communication graph as shown in Fig. 1-(a) . For the implementation of the algorithm, the step-size α k is set to 0.1/ √ k + 1 and 0.1, respectively. Figs. 5 and 6 present the players' actions generated by the proposed gradient-free algorithm with both diminishing step-size and constant step-size, respectively. For the gradient-based counterpart, the convergence results of the players' actions with both diminishing step-size α k = 0.1/ √ k + 1 and constant step-size α k = 0.1 are plotted in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively.
Comparing Figs. 5 and 7 for diminishing step-size, and Figs. 6 and 8 for constant step-size, it can be observed that the convergence speed of the gradient-based algorithm is generally faster than its gradient-free counterpart for both diminishing and constant step-size scenarios. This result is reasonable because the gradient-based algorithm has direct access to the true gradient, where the structure information is included. On the other hand, the faster speed implies more aggressive updates in the process, leading to a relatively larger overshoot, which can be moderated by a smaller step-size.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm for non-cooperative games among a group of players under a directed and strongly connected communication graph. The proposed algorithm does not require the knowledge on the explicit analytical expression of the cost function and allows the problem to be non-smooth. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium has been rigorously studied for both diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, by choosing a diminishing smoothing parameter, we have shown the convergence to the exact Nash equilibrium for diminishing step-size, and the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for constant step-size, in which the gap is proportional to the step-size. Finally, we have illustrated the performance of the algorithm through a numerical example in the application of HVAC system. An outlook to the future research can be the consideration of the dynamical systems in the gradient-free settings. Specifically, instead of having static unknown cost functions, players may follow some dynamics, where the exact model of these dynamics are unknown to the players.
